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Abstract
Range counting under differential privacy has been studied extensively. Unfortunately, lower bounds
based on discrepancy theory suggest that large errors have to be introduced in order to preserve
privacy: Essentially for any range space (except axis-parallel rectangles), the error has to be
polynomial. In this paper, we show that by allowing a standard notion of geometric approximation
where points near the boundary of the range may or may not be counted, the error can be reduced
to logarithmic. Furthermore, our approximate range counting data structure can be used to solve
the approximate nearest neighbor (ANN) problem and k-NN classification, leading to the first
differentially private algorithms for these two problems with provable guarantees on the utility.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Computational geometry; Security and
privacy → Formal methods and theory of security
Keywords and phrases Differential Privacy, Approximate Range Counting
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.SoCG.2021.45
Related Version Full Version: http://www.cse.ust.hk/~yike/DPRangeCount.pdf
Funding This work has been supported by HKRGC under grants 16202317, 16201318, and 16201819.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) [7] is a rigorous notion of privacy-preserving data publishing, which
has been widely adopted. Essentially, it ensures that no individual can substantially change
the probability distribution on the published results of an analysis. A central problem studied
under differential privacy is counting queries. Given a set of points P ⊆ U , where U is the
universe, the goal is to release a differentially private data structure of P , so that for any
query Q ⊆ U from a certain query family Q, we can find the count1 |P ∩Q|. To ensure the
privacy of P , some noise has to be injected to the query answers, so the key challenge is to
minimize the error under a given privacy budget (ε, δ); please see Section 2.1 for a more
formal DP definition and the meaning of the privacy parameters ε, δ.
When Q consists of arbitrary subsets of U , then the optimal error achievable is
√
n ·
poly( 1ε , log
|U|·|Q|
δ ) [12]. In the other extreme when Q = U , which are called point queries,
also known as the histogram problem, the error is O( 1ε ·min{log |U|, log
1
δ }) [22]. This is a
large gap. Thus, there have been a lot of interest in studying specific query families, and
particularly, identifying those that yield polylogarithmic errors. In this paper, we study query
families in constant-dimensional Euclidean space. More precisely, the dataset P consists of n
points from U = [u]d, where [u] denotes integers from 1 to u, while Q consists of geometric
ranges of a certain type, e.g., (axis-parallel) rectangles, halfspaces, simplices, spheres, or
arbitrarily-shaped regions. In the geometric setting, Q is often called a range space.
1 We allow P to be a multiset, i.e., the same point from U may appear multiple times in P . In this case,
|P ∩ Q| adds up all the multiplicities of points of P that are in Q.
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1.1 Previous work
For d = 1, the only interesting range space is the set of intervals. For this case, Dwork et





, as well as a lower bound
of Ω( 1ε log u)
2. Bun et al. [4] show that under (ε, δ)-DP, this lower bound can be broken,
achieving error 2(1+o(1)) log∗ u · log(1/δ)/ε. They also show an Ω(log∗ u · log(1/δ)/ε) lower
bound for exp(−εn/ log∗ n) ≤ δ ≤ 1/n2. Note that these lower bounds justify the restriction
that the points must have integer coordinates. In addition, they hold irrespective of the
space/time of the data structure. They solely rely on the privacy requirement.
For d ≥ 2, Chan et al. [5] extend the algorithm of [8] to answer axis-parallel rectangle






, which is later improved to O
(
1




These results show that rectangles are “easy”, namely, they admit polylogarithmic errors.
Unfortunately, it turns out they are essentially the only easy cases. Muthukrishnan and
Nikolov [18] and Nikolov et al. [19] build an equivalence between the error and the discrepancy
of the range space Q. Rectangle range counting has polylogarithmic errors essentially because
the discrepancy of rectangles is polylogarithmic [17]. On the other hand, since the discrepancy
of other natural range spaces, such as halfspaces, simplices, and spheres, is all nϕ(d), where
ϕ(d) ∈ [ 14 ,
1
2 ] is a constant depending on the particular range space and d [17], they are ruled
out for having polylogarithmic errors. Making things worse, if we allow nonconvex ranges,
the discrepancy becomes
√
n, which means that the aforementioned solution that works for
arbitrary query families [12] is already optimal, namely, geometry doesn’t help.
However, a series of differentially private range counting data structures [6, 14, 23, 16, 20,
21, 24] have been proposed by practitioners, mostly based on hierarchical space decompositions.
They work well on many real-world datasets, but perform badly on high-discrepancy point
sets, as predicted by the lower bounds [18, 19].






Figure 1 Approximate range counting.
1.2 Our results
This paper provides the theoretical justification that geometry does help, at least in constant
dimensions. However, in order to circumvent the polynomial discrepancy lower bounds, we
have to introduce some relaxation. Specifically, we consider approximate range counting as
defined in [1]. The diameter of a range Q is the largest distance between any two points in
Q. Given a range Q of diameter w and a constant fuzziness parameter 0 < α < 1, the inner
range Q−α is defined as the region of points whose distance from any point exterior to Q is at
2 All upper bounds stated in this paper hold for any single query with constant probability, while lower
bounds hold for the maximum error of all queries with constant probability.
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least αw, while the outer range Q+α is those points whose distance from a point interior to Q
is at most αw. Then any count between |P ∩Q−α | and |P ∩Q+α | is considered a valid answer
to Q, i.e., points in Q+α −Q−α may or may not be counted (see Figure 1). In fact, Blum et
al. [3] used a similar notion of geometric approximation with differential privacy, but their
error is still polynomial.
We show that polylogarithmic errors are achievable under this notion of approximation.









; and (2) under (ε, δ)-DP, the error can be reduced to O( 1ε (log log u + log
1
δ +
log1.5 n)), with a lower bound of Ω
( 1
ε log
∗ u · log(1/δ)
)
for exp(−εn/ log∗ n) ≤ δ ≤ 1/n2.
These results hold for any range space in constant dimensions (even if the ranges are
nonconvex). Compared with the
√
n lower bound mentioned above, we obtain this exponential
improvement exactly due to geometry – the notion of fuzziness has no counterpart in arbitrary
query families over an abstract set system. Technically, the fuzziness allows a packing
argument (see Theorem 5), which we borrow from the non-private setting [1].
In practice, this notion of fuzziness is often acceptable, considering that either data or
the range (or both) are often imprecise themselves. For example, if the public want to
know how many people got COVID-19 in their neighborhood, whether the cases near the
boundary are included or not is not very important. Another way of comparing our result
with prior work on DP range counting (which does not allow fuzziness) is that we have an
extra |P ∩ (Q+α −Q−α )| term in our error bound. This term is incomparable to
√
n, so our
result doesn’t contradict the discrepancy-based lower bound [18, 19]. However, this error
term is small on most real-world datasets, which explains why small errors are often observed
in many practical solutions.
Our data structures are naturally based on approximate range counting structures in the
non-private setting, in particular, the BBD-tree [1]. However, some non-trivial modifications
and analyses are needed to make the BBD-tree private, especially for reducing the dependence
on u in the (ε, δ)-DP case.
Our approximate range counting data structure can also be used to solve the approximate
nearest neighbor (ANN) problem and k-NN classification, yielding the first DP algorithms
for these two problems with provable guarantees on the utility. For the ANN problem,
returning the NN itself (or any other point in P ) is not private; instead, we return a distance
that approximates the nearest distance. Returning only the distance can still be useful in
many applications, e.g., if the user only wants to know whether there is a point in P that is
sufficiently close to her query point. Also, only the distance to the query point is needed in
k-NN classification; please see Section 4 for details.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Differential privacy
Let P ∼ P ′ denote two neighboring databases, i.e., one contains one more point than the
other.
▶ Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [10]). For ε > 0 and δ ≥ 0, a randomized algorithm M is
(ε, δ)-differentially private if for any neighboring databases P ∼ P ′ and any S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(P ) ∈ S] ≤ eε · Pr[M(P ′) ∈ S] + δ
The case when δ = 0 is also referred to as pure differential privacy. In practice, ε is usually
a constant ranging from 0.1 to 10, while δ must be much smaller than 1/n. For a numeric
query f , the most common technique for designing DP mechanisms is by masking the result
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with Laplace noise calibrated to the sensitivity of the query ∆f = maxP ∼P ′ |f(P )− f(P ′)|.
We use Lap(λ) to denote the Laplace distribution with parameter λ, which has probability
density function Pr[X = z] = 12λ exp(−|z|/λ) and variance 2λ
2. And the fact that Pr[|X| >
t · λ] ≤ exp(−t) is often useful to analyze the accuracy of the Laplace mechanism.
▶ Theorem 2 (Laplace Mechanism [10]). For a numeric query f over a database P , an
(ε, 0)-differentially private mechanism is to output f(P ) + X, where X ∼ Lap(∆f /ε).
We need the following properties of DP mechanisms.
▶ Theorem 3 (Basic Composition [10]). Let Mi be an (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism
for all i ∈ [k], then M(P ) = (M1(P ),M2(P ), . . . ,Mk(P )) is (kε, kδ)-differentially private.
▶ Theorem 4 (Group Privacy [10]). Let M be an (ε, 0)-differentially private mechanism. For
any two databases P and P ′ that differ by at most k individuals and any S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(P ) ∈ S] ≤ ekε · Pr[M(P ′) ∈ S]
2.2 The BBD-tree
The balanced box-decomposition tree (BBD-tree) [2] is a hierarchical space decomposition3
where each node is associated with a region of space called a cell. We define a box to be
an axis-parallel rectangle whose aspect ratio is either 1 or 2. Recall that points in P have
integer coordinates. To avoid the ambiguity of points lying on the boundary of a box, the
boxes’ corners all have coordinates in the form x + 12 for integer x. Each cell in the BBD-tree
is either a box or the region between two boxes, one enclosed within the other. Thus each
cell comprises of an outer box and an optional inner box. For a cell c, its size is the length of
the longest side of its outer box. We use size(c) to denote its size and count(c) to denote
the number of points in P lying inside c. The aspect ratio of each cell in the BBD-tree is
bounded by 2, which allows us to bound the number of cells that intersect any range of a
given diameter.
▶ Theorem 5 ([1]). Consider any space decomposition of height h, consisting of cells of
bounded aspect ratios. Let C be any subset of its cells, where each cell has size at least s and
they all intersect a range of diameter w. Then |C| = O(h + (w/s)d). If the cells are also
disjoint, then |C| = O((w/s)d).
Note that the quadtree has this property (where the aspect ratios are all 1), but it has a
large height h = O(log u). On the other hand, the BBD-tree has only O(log n) height. To
achieve this without violating the aspect ratio constraint, the key idea is to give a little more
flexibility to the shape of the cells.
The BBD-tree is a binary tree and is constructed by the repeated application of two
partitioning operations alternatively on each level, split and shrink. Starting from the root
node whose corresponding cell is the entire space [u]d, we recursively divide each cell c by
either split or shrink, until size(c) or count(c) is at most 1.
To split a cell, we bisect it along its longest side (it is guaranteed that the bisecting
hyperplane does not intersect c’s inner box if it has one). The resulting cells have aspect
ratio of either 1 or 2. Now consider the shrink operation. If c does not have an inner box,
3 As a hierarchical space decomposition naturally corresponds to a tree, where each node corresponds to
a cell, we will use the terms “node” and “cell” interchangeably.
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the shrink operation is performed by repeatedly applying split operations and recursing on
the child box bc with the majority of points in c, until count(bc ∩ c) ≤ 23 count(c). Then all
intermediate splits are discarded, and the two children of c are bc and c− bc (i.e., c and bc are
the outer and inner boxes of the cell c−bc; see Figure 2a). For the case when there is an inner
box bI in c, we first follow the same procedure to obtain the box bc. If bI ⊆ bc, then we shrink
c to bc − bI (the other child is thus c− bc). Otherwise, suppose the majority boxes obtained
during the series of splits are b1, . . . , bk = bc. Let bj be the smallest box in the sequence that
contains bI . Then we first shrink c to bj − bI (the other child is c− bj), then split bj − bI
to bj+1 and bj − bj+1 − bI , then shrink bj+1 to bc (the other child is bj+1 − bc), as shown in
Figure 2b. The shrink operations ensure that count(c) decreases by a constant factor as we
descend a constant number of levels, leading to an O(log n) height of the BBD-tree.
shrink





(b) shrink with an existing inner box bI
Figure 2 The shrink operation in the BBD-tree.
3 Approximate range counting
In this section, we describe and analyze our private range counting data structure. It is
similar to the existing heuristic solutions [6, 20, 24], namely, we also release a hierarchical
space decomposition that is differentially private and can be used to answer any range query.
Each cell c in the space decomposition is associated with a count masked by Laplace noise,
which we denote by noisy_count(c). However, there are two differences, which are important
for achieving theoretical guarantees: First, we use a different query procedure, which is
described in Section 3.1. Second, we use the BBD-tree as our space decomposition, and we
show how to make it private in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
3.1 Query procedure
Our query procedure is similar to the one in [1]. Given a space decomposition and a range
Q, we visit its cells in a top-down manner, summing up the noisy counts of cells as we go
along. We stop exploring further at a cell in the following two cases: (1) if c ∩Q−α = ∅, we
just skip c; and if (2) if c ⊆ Q+α , we add noisy_count(c) and then skip c. If we do not skip a
cell, we visit its children recursively. The detailed query procedure is given in Algorithm 1.
It is clear that line 1 in Algorithm 1 does not introduce any error. Line 2 introduces a
zero-mean error with magnitude proportional to the noise level, while line 3 introduces a
bias equal to count(c). We will account for these two sources of errors when analyzing the
accuracy of our private BBD-tree.
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Algorithm 1 Approximate Range Counting Procedure: Query(Q, α, c).
Input: a range Q; range approximation factor α; a cell c in the space decomposition.
Output: an answer to the α-approximate range query Q.
1: if c ∩Q−α = ∅ then return 0
2: if c ⊆ Q+α then return noisy_count(c)
3: if c is a leaf cell then return 0
4: s← 0
5: for each child c′ of c do
6: s← s + Query(Q, α, c′)
7: return s
3.2 Pure differential privacy
For pure DP, we use the BBD-tree with only split operations, which results in a full (binary)
quadtree. The quadtree has ud leaves and O(log u) height. It is safe to release this tree
structure as it does not depend on P . It is clear that the sensitivity of count(c) is 1 for each
cell c and each point contributes to the counts of d log u nodes on a root-to-leaf path. Then
by the basic composition theorem, adding noise drawn from Lap(d log u/ε) to each count(c)
is sufficient to preserve (ε, 0)-DP.
Now we analyze the error of an approximate range counting query. The proofs of the
following theorem, as well as some others, are given in the full version [15].
▶ Theorem 6. There is an (ε, 0)-differentially private space decomposition, such that any
α-approximate range counting query can be answered within error O
(
ε−1α−d/2 log u log 1β
)
with probability at least 1− β. Moreover, it can be pruned to O(n) nodes with probability at
least 1− β, and in this case the error is O
(
ε−1α−d log u log nβ
)
.
The log u dependency of the error follows from the height of the tree. One may wonder
if we could make the shrink operation differentially private, thus reducing its height to
O(log n). Unfortunately, we show that this is not possible under pure DP, by presenting an
Ω(log u) lower bound on the error for any pure DP approximate range counting algorithm
(see Section 5).
3.3 (ε, δ)-differential privacy
By adopting (ε, δ)-DP, we can improve the error dependence on u from log u to log log u. The
key, as mentioned above, is to make the shrink operations private. Recall that the original
shrink algorithm on a cell c uses a series of splits until the majority box contains at most
2
3 count(c) points. To make this comparison private and ensure that the shrink algorithm still
decreases count(c) by a constant factor, we can add noise proportional to count(c). However,
directly using count(c) to calibrate the noise would not be differentially private. In fact, even




ε ) instead. The
idea is to make O(log ñ) “guesses” for the right noise level, which is captured by a parameter
h. At h = 0, the magnitude of noise is ñO(1)/ε, and it will exponentially decrease as h
increases; at h = O(log ñ), the noise magnitude will become O(1/ε).
We now describe how to construct a private BBD-tree. We still use shrink and split
operations on alternating levels of the tree. The split operation is the same as in the standard
BBD-tree, while the private shrink operation is shown in Algorithm 2 for a given cell c with
noise level h. The shrink operation on the root node is invoked with h = 0; on a non-root
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node c, we will use h = hp + 1, where hp is the noise level used in the shrink operation at
the grandparent of c. We stop further subdividing c when size(c) = 1, when we are about to
invoke the shrink algorithm with h = H := ⌈2.5 log ñ⌉, or after the shrink algorithm returns
LEAF.
Algorithm 2 works as follows. If count(c) is too small compared with the the current
noise level (determined probabilistically), the algorithm will return AGAIN. In this case, we
invoke the algorithm again with h← h + 1, decreasing the noise magnitude by a constant
factor. Otherwise it will split c repeatedly and recurse on the majority box. Compared
with the non-private shrink operation, we make the following changes. Let bc be the current
majority box. First, we add noise before checking if count(bc ∩ c) ≤ 23 count(c). As a result,
we cannot guarantee that count(c) will decrease by a constant factor, but it will be the
case with high probability. Second, in the non-private case, we can just return bc when
count(bc∩ c) ≤ 23 count(c) after the last split. We can no longer do this, as being the majority
box is also sensitive information which depends on P (this was not sensitive before the splits
stop, as the count of the majority box was large enough to hide the presence or absence of
one data point). Instead, we return bc or its sibling after a noisy comparison. Finally, when
c has an inner box bI , the non-private shrink algorithm will never try to split bI because
the count would have become 0 ≤ 23 count(c) already. However, as the comparison with
2
3 count(c) is now probabilistic, we need to guard against this from happening. In particular,
when the algorithm tries to split bI , it will return LEAF. If the algorithm does not return
AGAIN or LEAF, it will return a box bc. Then we shrink c to bc as in the standard BBD-tree
as described in Section 2.2; this may involve an interleaving split in case c has an inner box
bI that is disjoint from bc.
Algorithm 2 Private Shrink Operation; Shrink(c, h, β).
Input: an input cell c = bo − bI (bI is optional) with noise level h; the failure probability β.





2: Draw ζ ∼ Lap(1/εh). Let R̃← count(c) + ζ.
3: if R̃ < 370 ·
(
log 2ñdβδ + log log u
)
/εh then return AGAIN
4: Draw γ ∼ Lap(1/εh). Let T̃ ← 23 count(c) + γ.
5: bc ← bo
6: repeat
7: bl, br ← split(bc)
8: if count(bl ∩ c) > count(br ∩ c) then bc ← bl else bc ← br
9: if bI exists and bc = bI then return LEAF
10: Draw η ∼ Lap(1/εh). Let θ̃ ← count(bc ∩ c) + η.
11: until θ̃ < T̃ or size(bc) = 1
12: Draw ξl, ξr ∼ Lap(1/εh).
13: if count(bl ∩ c) + ξl > count(br ∩ c) + ξr then bc ← bl else bc ← br
14: return bc
Finally, after the BBD-tree has been constructed, we associate each cell c a noisy count,
obtained by adding noise drawn from Lap(40 log ñ/ε) to count(c). The following theorem
guarantees its privacy and establishes some of its key properties that will be useful for proving
its utility.
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▶ Theorem 7. The private BBD-tree preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy. Furthermore, for
n > 8ε log
2
β , with probability at least 1− β, it has height O(log n) and O(n) nodes, and every




log nβδ + log log u
))
.
Proof. Let ℓh = 10 · (log 2ñdβδ + log log u)/εh. Note that in a private shrink operation
(Algorithm 2) on an input cell c with noise level h, all the noises are generated from
Lap(1/εh). We say that a Laplace noise is bounded if its absolute value does not exceed ℓh.
We begin with the following lemma on one invocation of Algorithm 2:
▶ Lemma 8. If all its Laplace noises are bounded, then Algorithm 2 (1) will not return
LEAF; (2) if it returns AGAIN, then we have count(c) ≤ 38ℓh; (3) otherwise we must have
count(c) ≥ 36ℓh, and the algorithm returns a child box bc which satisfies either of the following
two properties: (a) size(bc) > 1 and 14 count(c) ≤ count(bc ∩ c) ≤
3
4 count(c); (b) size(bc) = 1
and count(bc ∩ c) ≥ 14 count(c).
Proof. (2) is easy to show. If Algorithm 2 returns AGAIN, since all noises are bounded, then
it follows from line 3 that count(c) ≤ 37ℓh − ζ ≤ 38ℓh. The first part of (3) is also true, since
if the algorithm does not return AGAIN, we must have count(c) ≥ 37ℓh − ζ ≥ 36ℓh.
Next, we prove the second part of (3). Let b(1)c , b(1)l , b
(1)






r , θ̃(k) denote
the values of the variables bc, bl, br, θ̃ at the end of each iteration in the repeat-until loop;
note that b(i)c is always the majority box between b(i)l and b
(i)
r , i = 1, . . . , k. Let bc be the
final output child box which is either b(k)l or b
(k)
r after a noisy comparison (line 13). We have
k ≤ d log u as every d splits will decrease size(b(i)c ) by a factor of 2. To prove the second part
of (3), we only need to consider the case size(bc) > 1. In this case, we have θ̃(k) < T̃ and
θ̃(k−1) ≥ T̃ according to line 11. Given θ̃(k) < T̃ , we have
count(bc ∩ c) ≤ count(b(k)c ∩ c) ≤
2
3count(c)− η
(k) + γ ≤ 23count(c) + 2ℓh ≤
3
4count(c),
where the first inequality is because bc is either b(k)l or b
(k)
r , while b(k)c is the majority box
between b(k)l and b
(k)
r ; the second inequality follows from the definition of θ̃(k) and T̃ ; the
third inequality follows from the boundedness of η(k) and γ; and the fourth inequality is due
to count(c) ≥ 36ℓh. On the other hand, given θ̃(k−1) > T̃ , following similar arguments, we
have
count(b(k−1)c ∩ c) ≥
2
3count(c)− η
(k−1) + γ ≥ 23count(c)− 2ℓh.
Assume w.l.o.g. that bc = b(k)l . Then,
2 · count(bc ∩ c) = count(b(k)l ∩ c) + count(b
(k)
l ∩ c)
≥ count(b(k)l ∩ c) + (count(b
(k)
r ∩ c)− ξl + ξr)
= count(b(k−1)c ∩ c)− ξl + ξr
≥ count(b(k−1)c ∩ c)− 2ℓh
≥ 23count(c)− 4ℓh,
where the first inequality follows from line 13, and the second inequality follows from the
boundedness of ξl and ξr. Because count(c) ≥ 36ℓh, we have
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For (1), observe that b(i)c is not identical to bI (if it exists) for any i ∈ [k], since




c ∩ c) ≥
1
3count(c)− ℓh > 0,
where the first inequality is because b(i)c is the majority box after a split on b(i−1)c ; the
second inequality follows from θ̃(i−1) > T̃ and the boundedness of η(i−1) and γ; and the third
inequality is due to count(c) ≥ 36ℓh. Thus the algorithm will not return LEAF. ◁
We are now ready to prove the utility properties of a private BBD-tree. If the event F that
n ≤ ñ ≤ 2n holds, the O(log n) height trivially follows from the construction algorithm. Due
to the exponential tail of the Laplace distribution and n > 8ε log
2
β , we have Pr[F ] ≥ 1− β/2.
To prove that the tree has O(n) nodes and the property of the leaves stated in the theorem,
consider the event E that the Laplace noises used in all invocations of Algorithm 2 when
constructing the private BBD-tree are bounded, conditioned upon which the properties
stated in Lemma 8 hold.
▶ Lemma 9. Pr[E] ≥ 1− βδ/2.
Proof. In one invocation of Algorithm 2 on a cell c, we draw O(d log u) independent Laplace
noises from Lap(1/εh), so they are all bounded with probability at least 1− βδ/(2ñ10), due
to the exponential tail of Laplace distribution and a union bound. To bound the noise values
in all the invocations, first consider the case when Algorithm 2 returns AGAIN. When this
happens, we invoke it on c again with noise level h← h + 1. This step is logically equivalent
to making two copies of c, say c′ and c′′, such that c′ is the only child of c and c′′ is the
only child of c′. Recall that we alternate between split and shrink operations, so we will
later perform a shrink on c′′ with h ← h + 1. Then in this logically equivalent BBD-tree,
we only invoke one split operation or one shrink operation (or just make a copy of itself).
Recall that we stop the construction when we reach H = 2.5 log ñ, and one shrink operation
may generate 4 levels of the tree (in case an interleaving split is needed), so the height of the
logical tree is at most 4H = 10 log ñ. Thus, it has at most ñ10 nodes, namely, at most ñ10
invocations of Algorithm 2. Then the lemma is proved by a union bound. ◁
▶ Lemma 10. Conditioned upon E ∧ F , the private BBD-tree has O(n) nodes and every




log nβδ + log log u
))
.
Proof. Conditioned upon E, all the shrink operations have the three properties stated in
Lemma 8. For any leaf c of size larger than 1, consider the path from root to c in the
BBD-tree. There are exactly H invocations of Algorithm 2 on the path, as none of them
has returned LEAF. At most log4/3 n < H (as the event F holds) of them have returned a
child box, since every such shrink operation decreases the count by a factor at least 14 . This
means that there is at least one invocation of Algorithm 2 that returned AGAIN.
Let c∗ be the smallest cell on this path on which Algorithm 2 returned AGAIN, and let h∗
be its noise level. By Lemma 8,














Each of the remaining H − h∗ shrink operations must have reduced the count by a factor of
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To see that the BBD-tree has O(n) nodes, consider the parent or grandparent, depending
on which one is on the shrink level, of any leaf. Algorithm 2 might have been invoked on
this node multiple times, but the last one must have returned a child box, implying that it
contained at least ℓH data points by Lemma 8. Then we conclude that the private BBD-tree
has O(n) nodes since there are O(log n) levels and each level has at most O(n/ℓH) nodes.
◁
Finally, we prove its privacy.
▶ Lemma 11. The private BBD-tree preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. Note that releasing ñ preserves (ε/4, 0)-DP. Furthermore, there are two parts of
the BBD-tree: its structure and the noisy counts associated with its cells. Since the
height of the tree is at most 10 log ñ, the released noisy counts preserves (ε/4, 0)-DP by a
standard argument. Below, we show that the tree structure is (ε/2, δ)-DP. Then by the basic
composition theorem, the private BBD-tree achieves (ε, δ)-DP.
The structure depends on the input point set P , as well as the Laplace noises generated
internally during all the invocations of Algorithm 2. Let M(P, Γ) denote the tree structure
constructed on point set P using noises Γ. We will show that for any two neighboring data
sets P , P ′, and any tree structure y,
Pr[M(P, Γ) = y ∧ E] ≤ eε/2 · Pr[M(P ′, Γ) = y], (1)
where the probability is computed over the randomness of Γ, Then, for any set of output
structures S, we have
Pr[M(P, Γ) ∈ S] ≤ Pr[M(P, Γ) ∈ S ∧ E] + Pr[Ē] ≤ eε/2 · Pr[M(P ′, Γ) ∈ S] + δ,
namely, M is (ε/2, δ)-DP.
To prove Eq. (1), it suffices to demonstrate an injection f from {Γ :M(P, Γ) = y ∧E}
to {Γ : M(P ′, Γ) = y} such that Pr(Γ) ≤ eε/2 · Pr(f(Γ)). In order to achieve this, f can
only change a small number of Laplace noises by a constant magnitude each. Note that
the presence or absence of a data point will only affect the cells on a root-to-leaf path of y.
For any Γ such that M(P, Γ) = y and all noises in Γ are bounded (i.e., event E holds), we
follow the path starting from the root while making changes to Γ so that M(P ′, f(Γ)) = y.
Since the split operations do not depend on P , we only need to consider all the H shrink
operations on that path.
For a cell c, we use count(c) to denote its count in P while count′(c) its count in P ′. Note
that |count(c)− count′(c)| ≤ 1 for any c. We use ζ, η, R̃, T̃ , . . . to denote the noises in Γ,
and ζ ′, η′, R̃′, T̃ ′, . . . for their counterparts in f(Γ). The injection is defined as follows for
each invocation of Algorithm 2:
1. Set ζ ′ := ζ + count(c)− count′(c). Then we have R̃′ = R̃, which makes the decisions at
line 2 on P and P ′ are the same. Note that |ζ ′ − ζ| = |count(c)− count′(c)| ≤ 1.
2. Recall the definitions of b(·)c , b(·)l , b
(·)
r , η(·), θ̃(·) in the proof of Lemma 8. Set T̃ ′ := T̃ − 1,
η′
(i) := η(i) for 1 ≤ i < k, and θ̃′(k) := θ̃(k) − 2. Note that |γ′ − γ| ≤ 2 in order to
achieve T̃ ′ := T̃ − 1 since |count(c) − count′(c)| ≤ 1. We already have θ̃(i) ≥ T̃ for
1 ≤ i < k and θ̃(k) < T̃ on P . For 1 ≤ i < k, since θ̃(i) ≥ T̃ , we have count(b(i)c ) >
2
3 count(c) − 2ℓh >
1
2 count(c) + ℓh by |η
(i)| ≤ ℓh, |γ| ≤ ℓh and count(c) ≥ 36ℓh. This
implies that the difference between count(b(i)l ) and count(b
(i)
r ) is at least ℓh, then the
presence or absence of a single data point will not affect the choice of the majority
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box b(i)c on line 8, thus we have |θ̃′
(i) − θ̃(i)| ≤ 1 by |count(b(i)c ) − count′(b(i)c )| ≤ 1 and
η′
(i) = η(i). Since b(k−1)c in the invocations on P and P ′ are the same, we can conclude
that |count′(bc(k))− count(b(k)c )| ≤ 1, implying that |η′(k) − η(k)| ≤ 3 in order to achieve
θ̃′
(k) := θ̃(k) − 2. Given θ̃(i) ≥ T̃ for 1 ≤ i < k and θ̃(k) < T̃ , by the above mapping, we
will have θ̃′(i) ≥ T̃ ′ for 1 ≤ i < k and θ̃′(k) < T̃ ′. This implies that the repeat-until loop
in the invocations on P and P ′ are the same.
3. Set ξ′l := count(b
(k)
l ) + ξl − count′(b
(k)
l ), ξ′r := count(b
(k)
r ) + ξr − count′(b(k)r ). This makes
the decision on line 13 in the invocations on P and P ′ the same. We have |ξ′l − ξl| ≤ 1
since |count′(b(k)l )− count(b
(k)
l )| ≤ 1, and similarly |ξ′r − ξr| ≤ 1.
Note that the injection defined above changes the values of the noises drawn from
Lap(1/εh) by at most 8, so the ratio between Pr(Γ) and Pr(f(Γ)) is bounded by exp(8 · εh)








· Pr(f(Γ)) ≤ exp(ε/2) · Pr(f(Γ)),
and Eq. (1) is proved. ◁
Then Theorem 7 follows from Lemma 9, 10, and 11. ◀
Now we analyze the error when using the private BBD-tree to answer approximate range
queries.
▶ Theorem 12. Given an (ε, δ)-differentially private BBD-tree and any α-approximate range
query Q, for n > 8ε log
2





α−d(log nβδ + log log u) + log
1.5 n log 1β + α




4.1 Approximate nearest neighbor
In the approximate nearest neighbor (ANN) problem, the goal is to find a data point p ∈ P
such that dist(p, q) ≤ (1 + α)dist(p∗, q) for any given query point q, where p∗ is the nearest
neighbor of q in P and 0 < α < 1 is the approximation ratio. In the non-private setting, there
is a standard approach using BBD-tree to solve ANN problem [2]. In the private setting,
however, there are two differences. First, returning a data point in P will clearly breach
privacy. Thus, we must settle for a slightly weaker target, namely, we will aim to return only
the approximate distance to the NN, but not the NN itself. Second, the non-private BBD-tree
has no errors, while its private versions do. This introduces some technical complications. In
particular, we can no longer measure the approximation ratio of the ANN compared with the
nearest neighbor p∗, but the τ -th nearest neighbor. More precisely, our goal is to return a
distance r such that r(1) ≤ r ≤ (1 + α)r(τ), where r(τ) is the distance between q and its τ -th
nearest neighbor in P . We call τ the rank error ; obviously, smaller τ means better utility.
We present a more general algorithm for approximately finding the distance between
a query point q and its k-th nearest neighbor in P , given an approximate range counting
synopsis with error κ for (α/10)-approximate spherical range queries. Note that since the
whole space is [u]d, the smallest and the largest possible distance between two distinct
points are 1 and
√
du respectively. Let B(q, w) denote the open ball with radius w centered
at q. From the approximate range counting synopsis, we obtain approximate counts for
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|P ∩B(q, 1/2)|, |P ∩B(q, (1 + α/3)/2)|, |P ∩B(q, (1 + α/3)2/2)|, . . . , |P ∩B(q, (1 + α/3)t/2)|,
where t = ⌈log1+α/3(2
√
du)⌉; denote these approximate counts as a0, a1, a2, . . . , at. Let
i = min{i | ai > k + κ}. Then we output r = (1 + α/10)(1 + α/3)i/2 if i ̸= 0; otherwise we
return r = 0.
▶ Lemma 13. For any k ≤ n− 2κ, the above algorithm returns an r such that r(k) ≤ r ≤
(1 + α)r(k+2κ).
In the private setting, we use our private BBD-trees presented in Section 3.2 and 3.3 as
the approximate range counting synopsis.
▶ Theorem 14. There is an (ε, δ)-differentially private synopsis such that, with probability
at least 1− β, the distance to the ANN for any query point can be found with a rank error of





ε−1α−d/2 log u log tβ , δ = 0;
ε−1 ·
(
α−d(log nβδ + log log u) + log
1.5 n log tβ + α
−d/2 log n log tβ
)
, δ > 0.
4.2 k-NN classification
In k-NN classification, we are given m classes of points P1, P2, . . . , Pm, and i is called the
label of Pi. Given a query point q, the k-NN algorithm returns the label that is most common
among its k nearest neighbors in P = P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pm.
To obtain a private k-NN algorithm, we release an (ε/2, δ/2)-private BBD-tree for P , as
well as an (ε/2, δ/2)-private BBD-tree for each Pi. This preserves an overall (ε, δ)-DP, since
the presence or absence of one point affects only two private BBD-trees. For a given query
point q, we invoke the algorithm in Section 4.1 on P with approximation factor α/3, obtaining
an r such that r(k) ≤ r ≤ (1 + α/3)r(k+O(τε,δ)). Next, we query the private BBD-trees with
approximation factor α/10 to obtain approximate counts for |P1∩B(q, r)|, . . . , |Pm∩B(q, r)|.
Finally, we return the label i with the largest estimated |Pi ∩B(q, r)|.
Our private k-NN algorithm has the following utility guarantee. Intuitively, it says that
as long as the correct label wins the majority in the k nearest neighbors of q by a poly-
logarithmic margin, while the distances measured are allowed an (1±α)-factor approximation,
then the algorithm will find it with high probability.
▶ Theorem 15. There exists absolute constants C1 and C2 such that, with probability at least
1− β, our private k-NN synopsis can be used to find the correct label i for any query point q,
provided that |Pi ∩B(q, (1−α)r(k))| − |Pj ∩B(q, (1 + α)r(k+C1·τε,δ))| ≥ C2 · τε,δ for all j ̸= i.
Note that our algorithm releases a private k-NN classifier, which can be used to classify
any query point. On the other hand, the private k-NN classifier in [11] only releases the
classification results (with no utility guarantees) for a given set of queries, while no more
queries can be accepted afterwards. Thus we solve a much more general problem than theirs.
5 Lower bounds
Observe that the errors in Theorem 6 and 14 for pure DP have an O(log u) term. In this
section, we show that this is unavoidable even in one dimension. In particular, we prove the
following lower bound on the one-dimensional ANN problem with a constant approximation
factor α = 0.1 and a constant failure probability β = 1/3 via a packing argument [13]. This
in turn implies a lower bound for approximate range counting.
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▶ Theorem 16. Any (ε, 0)-differentially private one-dimensional ANN algorithm that, with
probability at least 2/3, returns an r such that r(1) ≤ r ≤ 1.1 · r(τ) for every query point q,





▶ Corollary 17. Any (ε, 0)-differentially private one-dimensional approximate range counting
algorithm that, with probability at least 2/3, answers all 0.01-approximate range queries with





We can also show a lower bound under (ε, δ)-DP by a reduction from exact (i.e., no
fuzziness) range counting [4]:
▶ Theorem 18. Any (ε, δ)-differentially private one-dimensional approximate range counting
algorithm that, with probability at least 2/3, answers all 0.01-approximate range queries with
error at most κε,δ, must have κε,δ = Ω
( 1
ε · (log
∗ u) · log(1/δ)
)
, for exp(−εn/ log∗ n) ≤ δ ≤
1/n2.
Note that this lower bound means that (1) some dependency on u is inevitable even
under (ε, δ)-DP, justifying the restriction that the points have integer coordinates; and (2) a
logarithmic dependency on n/δ is also necessary.
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